Finland is proposing a significant centralization of power to allow the state to seize private property without prior negotiation in emergencies. A working group appointed by the Ministry of Defence last autumn has drafted amendments to the 2020 Act on the Redeployment of Immovable Property for Security Reasons, known as the turvalunastuslaki. The proposed changes would streamline a rarely used process, placing one ministry in ultimate control over decisions affecting Finnish homes, land, and businesses deemed a national security risk.
The proposed system could see a family farm near a critical rail line or a private port facility on the Baltic coast transition to state ownership within a tightened procedural framework. The core principle remains: the state can already compulsorily purchase or take control of immovable property to ensure national security, security of supply, or the functioning of critical infrastructure. The new proposals aim to make invoking this power faster and more decisive by removing bureaucratic hurdles identified as obstacles since the law's inception.
Centralizing Authority in the Ministry of Defence
The key recommendation is to centralize all authority related to security redeployment under the Ministry of Defence. The working group's memorandum states that the ministry possesses the most comprehensive experience in drafting threat assessments related to properties and the authority functions closest to security redeployment. Currently, the responsibility for identifying a threat and initiating proceedings can fall across multiple ministries, from Transport and Communications to Economic Affairs and Employment.
This diffusion has led to practical inertia. The law, passed in 2020, has never been used. The working group identified inter-ministerial confusion as a primary cause. “Most ministries find the application of the security redeployment act challenging and unfamiliar,” the memo notes. It cites difficulties in forming a situational picture, conducting threat assessments, and addressing resource and expertise issues. A major challenge was scenarios where a matter falls under the purview of several ministries, or where a threat assessment from a single ministry's perspective did not cross the intervention threshold, but a collective assessment of all threats might.
A New Triggers and a Streamlined Process
Under the new model, a “trigger” regarding a property threatening national security could be submitted to the Ministry of Defence from any ministry, authority, public company, or utility. The Ministry of Defence could also initiate a review on its own. Once a potential threat is flagged, the ministry would conduct a threat assessment. If that assessment supports redeployment, the Ministry of Defence would still consult the relevant sectoral ministry—for example, the Ministry of Transport and Communications concerning a road matter.
Following this consultation, the security redeployment process could be initiated. The decision to start the process would be made by the Ministry of Defence itself or, in particularly significant cases, by the entire Government. Crucially, in an urgent situation, the amendments would allow authorities to take control of a property immediately, without first attempting voluntary negotiations for its sale. This represents a notable shift towards expediency over negotiated settlement in crisis scenarios.
Maintaining a National Security Property Database
Another significant proposal is for the Ministry of Defence to begin maintaining a situational picture of properties that could pose a potential security threat. This proactive monitoring would move beyond a reactive system, creating a standing overview of critical infrastructure choke points or strategically sensitive locations owned by private entities or foreign interests. The working group argues this centralized intelligence is essential for swift action. The current system relies on disparate assessments across government, which the memo suggests can lead to a fragmented view where the cumulative risk of multiple small threats is missed.
The Practical Implications for Property Owners
The legislative changes are framed by the government as a necessary hardening of Finland's security apparatus in a changed geopolitical environment. The explicit goal is to eliminate procedural ambiguity that could delay the state's response to a hybrid threat or other emergency where control of a specific geographic asset is paramount. For a property owner, the changes mean a more centralized and potentially quicker path to compulsory purchase. The requirement for fair compensation remains unchanged by the proposals, but the window for discussion or challenge before the state assumes control could be shortened dramatically in an “urgent situation” as defined by the authorities.
Critically, the law’s fundamental criteria for intervention—a threat to national security, security of supply, or critical infrastructure—remain broad. The proposed changes do not narrow these definitions but rather strengthen the mechanism for acting upon them. The working group's rationale hinges on the premise that the existing law's complexity has rendered it a paper tiger, the amendments aim to make it a readily deployable tool.
The Path to Legislative Approval
The working group's proposals are now with the Ministry of Defence, which will prepare a government bill for submission to Parliament. The bill will undergo the standard legislative process: review by the relevant parliamentary committees, including the Defence Committee and the Constitutional Law Committee, which will scrutinize its implications for property rights. Given the broad consensus on national security priorities in the Eduskunta, the bill is likely to find support, though its specific provisions regarding urgent seizures and centralized power may prompt detailed debate. If passed, the reformed law would place Finland among European states with more streamlined mechanisms for state intervention in property rights for strategic reasons, reflecting a continent-wide trend of hardening critical infrastructure against disruption.